I study the provision of information as an intertemporal incentive in a continuoustime sender-receiver model. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and sends signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses actions which affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal dynamic information policy in closed form. Under this policy, the sender provides information gradually, contingent on the receiver's past actions. I show that the sender can implement this policy by truthfully reporting the state with a delay that shrinks over time.
Introduction
Incentives often take the form of monetary rewards. To motivate behavior, such rewards are conditioned on past outcomes or actions. If transfers are either disallowed or inflexible, can information be used as the currency of these rewards? This question is important for any entity with private access to information. For example, a manager controls the flow of feedback to an employee or apprentice, through the structure and timing of performance reviews. Online platforms determine which data is displayed to users over time, through notifications, ratings, recommendations, search results, 'likes', and 'matches'.
I study the provision of information as an intertemporal incentive in a continuous-time model with a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and sends signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses actions which affect the welfare of both players. The sender and receiver have conflicting quadratic-loss utilities as in the "cheap talk" model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Specifically, the receiver wishes to match his action with the state, but the sender wants the receiver to shift his action above the state by a fixed bias.
The sender initially commits to a dynamic information policy that assigns a signal distribution to each private history of past states, signals, and actions. The receiver is aware of the chosen policy and the sender's commitment to it. As time passes, the sender observes the evolving state and the receiver's actions, and she sends signals as prescribed by the information policy. The receiver observes the sender's signals and chooses actions sequentially to maximize his expected utility. Since the receiver is forward-looking, he considers the effect of his actions both on his flow payoff and on the informativeness of the sender's future signals. The sender, anticipating the receiver's best response, chooses an information policy to maximize her expected utility.
The fundamental trade-off for the sender is between precision and informational leverage.
On the one hand, providing the receiver with precise information about the current state makes it possible for the receiver to better tailor his action to changes in the state. This greater responsiveness makes both players better off. But because the state is persistent, informing the receiver about the current state also reduces his uncertainty about future states. This increases the receiver's reservation utility-the continuation value he can secure if he receives no further information from the sender. A higher reservation utility makes the receiver less willing to distort his action upward in exchange for future information.
The sender faces a complex, nested optimization problem. The space of all information policies is large; moreover, for each policy, payoffs depend on the solution to the receiver's resulting dynamic optimization problem. To overcome this complexity, I reduce the sender's problem in two stages.
First, I change the domain of optimization from information policies to decision rules, i.e., state-dependent distributions of actions over time. For any information policy, the receiver's best response induces a decision rule, which in turn determines payoffs. Therefore, I can equivalently optimize over all decision rules that are best responses to some information policy. Using the revelation principle, I show that there is no loss in restricting attention to information policies in which (i) each signal is an action recommendation, and (ii) all future information is cut off if the receiver disobeys a recommendation. I provide an obedience condition that characterizes whether a decision rule can be induced by a policy of this form.
Next, I identify two statistics-bias and variance-that pin down the payoffs from each decision rule. At each point in time, the bias is the difference between the action recommended to the receiver and the receiver's expectation of the state. 1 The variance is the conditional variance of the current state, as perceived by the receiver given all the action recommendations he has received. In general, the bias and variance at each time can be stochastic, but I show that it suffices to optimize over obedient decision rules with deterministic bias and variance. This optimization reduces to a deterministic optimal control problem which I solve in closed form using Lagrangian relaxation and dynamic programming.
The optimal bias and variance functions are stated in Theorem 1. The solution takes one of two forms, depending on the size of the sender's preference bias. If the sender's preference bias is sufficiently small relative to the variance rate of the state process, then the sender can induce her first-best decision rule. She perfectly discloses the state to the receiver but threatens to cut off all future information if the receiver ever fails to select the sender's desired action.
If the sender's preference bias is sufficiently large relative to the variance rate of the state process, then the sender cannot induce her first-best decision rule. In this case, the precisionleverage trade-off is in force. The sender resolves this trade-off with a non-stationary policy that endogenously generates a distinctive life cycle for the relationship, as described below.
In this case, the optimal policy features two distinct phases. In the first phase, the sender provides increasingly precise information about the current state while gradually narrowing the gap between the action she recommends and the receiver's most preferred action. At some finite time, the sender reveals the current state completely, and the second phase begins. Thereafter, the sender keeps the receiver perfectly informed of the current state but demands that the receiver maintain a fixed gap between his action and the state.
If the receiver were to disobey, then the sender would cut off all future information. Then, as the state continues to evolve, the receiver would grow increasingly uncertain of the current state.
The optimal information policy is expressed in terms of the conditional variance of the state, as assessed by the receiver, at each point in time. How can the sender structure her signals to maintain the desired uncertainty? For a particularly simple implementation, I propose delayed reporting. At each time t, the sender reports the value of the state at some earlier time φ(t). Theorem 2 establishes that the optimal information policy can be implemented in this way, for some increasing function φ.
Delayed reporting proves quite convenient. Since the state follows a Markov process, the receiver's updated belief about the current state depends only on the sender's most recent report. This simplifies the receiver's belief-updating procedure. Of course, early in the relationship when the state history is short, the sender may need to incorporate independent noise into her signals. But after enough time has passed, the sender's signal is a non-random function of the realized state history. These properties carry over to any Markovian setting, so delayed reporting holds promise as a general technique for implementation.
Finally, I consider two extensions of the main model. In each one, I solve for the sender's optimal information policy. In the first extension, states and actions are multidimensional, and the components of the state evolve independently. Under the optimal information policy, the sender reveals information about each component sequentially, from the least to the most mean-reverting. In the second extension, the sender and receiver discount the future at different rates. I examine comparative statics with respect to the sender's patience.
Related literature
My paper builds upon static Bayesian persuasion, which was introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) using methods from Aumann et al. (1995) . 2 Static persuasion has been extended to a variety of dynamic settings. In Renault et al. (2017) and Ely (2017) , the state follows a Markov chain, and the sender persuades a sequence a short-lived receivers. 3 Thus, the receivers do not respond to intertemporal incentives.
In another family of dynamic extensions, the receiver makes a binary choice and decides how long to wait before making this choice. As the receiver waits, the sender sequentially provides information. In Honryo (2016) , the sender is endowed with a fixed number of verifiable arguments that cannot be made simultaneously. In Bizotto et al. (2017) , news arrives exogenously until a deadline, and the focus is on whether the receiver acts immediately. In Au (2015) , the receiver has a private type, and the sender may provide information sequentially in order to screen the receiver's type. In my model, by contrast, the receiver acts repeatedly and the state evolves over time.
The three closest papers study the provision of information to a forward-looking receiver who chooses a stopping time. In Ely and Szydlowski (2017) and Smolin (2017) , the receiver chooses when to quit, and the sender tries to keep the receiver working for as long as possible.
In Orlov et al. (2018) , the receiver chooses when to exercise a real option, and the sender is biased towards either late or early exercise. 4 A common theme of these papers is that the promise of future information can encourage the receiver to wait longer before stopping.
In my paper, information not only rewards the receiver for past actions but also guides the receiver's continuous action choice at each point in time. As a result, the sender has a countervailing precision motive to keep the receiver informed so that he can tailor his action to the current state. I focus on the sender's resulting precision-leverage trade-off, which to my knowledge has not been studied previously.
Methodologically, my paper departs from the belief-based approach commonly used in persuasion models. That method crucially relies on expressing the sender's payoff as a function of the receiver's posterior belief about the state. 5 In my model, the receiver's action depends not only on his belief about the state but also on the nature of the sender's information policy. I adapt the information design approach of Bergemann and Morris (2013 , 2016 ) from its original static, multi-player context to my dynamic, single-player setting. The idea is to characterize the set of obedient decision rules and then maximize the sender's utility over that set.
Finally, dynamic information design has been studied in a number of specific contexts.
Feedback in multi-stage tournaments is studied by Lizzeri et al. (2002) , Aoyagi (2010) , Ederer (2010) , and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) . Halac et al. (2017) and Bimpikis et al. (2017) study the joint design of feedback and prizes in contests for innovation. In a single-agent model with information and transfers, Orlov (2015) observes that higher transfers are needed to motivate an agent who is better informed. Kremer et al. (2014) and Che and Hörner (forthcoming) study the design of information to encourage sequential experimentation. Hörner and Lambert (2017) and Varas et al. (2017) study the motivational role of ratings in a career concerns framework. In Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016) , the sender gradually reveals information over time in order to extract payments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves a two-period example. The main analysis begins in Section 4, where I reduce 4 Orlov et al. (2018) show that the sender may find it optimal to "pipette" information gradually over time if she lacks dynamic commitment. In my model, "pipetting" is optimal even though the sender has full dynamic commitment. Relatedly, Henry and Ottaviani (2017) study a sender who can reveal Brownian innovations to a receiver at a cost. However, the sender cannot construct arbitrary information policies from these innovations.
5 Ely et al. (2015) define a utility function directly over stochastic processes of beliefs, so their model is amenable to the belief-based approach. the sender's problem to a tractable optimal control problem. Section 5 describes the optimal information policy and analyzes comparative statics. Section 6 discusses implementation through delayed reporting. Section 7 studies extensions, and Section 8 concludes. Appendix A formally defines strategies for both players. Proofs are in Appendix B.
Model
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. There are two players: a sender (she) and a receiver (he). At each time t ∈ [0, ∞), the state θ t ∈ R is realized and the receiver chooses an action a t ∈ R. Flow payoffs for the receiver and sender, respectively, are given by
where β is positive. The receiver wants to match his action with the state, but the sender wants the receiver to shift his action above the state by β, the sender's (preference) bias.
The initial state θ 0 is normally distributed with mean µ 0 and variance σ 2 0 . The state then evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
where the driving process Z = {Z t } t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion independent of θ 0 .
Assume σ is positive. The parameter σ 2 is the variance rate, and κ is the percentage drift.
The sign of κ is unrestricted. If κ < 0, then (1) is a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. If κ = 0, then θ t − θ 0 = σZ t , so the state follows a Brownian motion with zero drift. 6 If κ > 0, then the state process is explosive. The role of κ can be seen in the formula for the conditional expectation:
The state process is common knowledge, but only the sender observes the state realizations. The sender also observes the receiver's actions. Before observing any state realizations, the sender commits to a dynamic information policy S, which specifies a signal space S and assigns a distribution over signals to each history
states, signals, and actions.
Once the sender commits to an information policy (and makes the receiver aware of that policy), the receiver faces a single-agent sequential decision problem. At each time t, after observing the signals sent up to time t, the receiver updates his beliefs and chooses his action. The sender's signals are the receiver's only source of information about the state.
In particular, the receiver does not observe past flow payoffs. 7
The receiver's action choices over time determine a stochastic process A = {A t } t≥0 , which will be called a decision rule as in Bergemann and Morris (2016) . The sender and receiver have a common discount rate r. Assume r > 2κ. This ensures that taking a constant action yields a finite expected utility for both players. The payoffs from a decision rule A are given by the expected discounted accumulated flow utilities
Given an information policy S, the receiver chooses his actions over time to maximize his expected utility. More formally, the receiver chooses from among all decision rules A that are compatible with S in the sense that at each time t, the sender's signals up to time t provide sufficient information for the receiver to match his action with A t . A decision rule
A is a best response to an information policy S if A maximizes the receiver's utility over all decision rules compatible with S.
Anticipating the receiver's best response to each information policy, the sender chooses an information policy to maximize her expected utility. Formally, the sender's problem is to maximize u S (A) over all information policy-decision rule pairs (S, A) such that A is a best response to S. 8
The model is set in continuous time so that the sender's problem admits interpretable closed-form solutions, 9 but this comes at the cost of well-known pathologies of perfect monitoring in continuous time (Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989) . See Appendix A for measuretheoretic definitions of strategies for both players.
Two-period example
To build intuition for the analysis of the general model below, I first study a two-period example. The periods are indexed by t = 1, 2. For an action path a = (a 1 , a 2 ) and a state path θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), the payoffs for the receiver and sender, respectively, are
The initial state θ 1 has a normal distribution N (0, σ 2 1 ). The second-period state is given realization to at most two values. 8 In order to guarantee that a solution exists, this formulation implicitly breaks ties in the sender's favor. 9 Working in continuous time has the additional advantage that information policies can be implemented cleanly through delayed reporting, as discussed in Section 6. Moreover, in discrete time, comparative statics in the players' patience are confounded because the discount rate also controls the importance of the monitoring gap between the beginning and end of each period.
where ε has a normal distribution N (0, σ 2 ), independent of θ 1 . The persistence parameter ρ ∈ R is unrestricted. In total, this setting is characterized by the four parameters β, σ 1 , ρ, and σ.
As in the main model, the state distribution is common knowledge, but the state realizations are observed only by the sender. Before the first period, the sender commits to a dynamic information policy mapping each private history to a distribution of signals. The game proceeds as follows. In the first period, the sender observes the state θ 1 and sends the receiver a signal s 1 drawn from the distribution prescribed by the information policy at the history h 1 = θ 1 . The receiver observes s 1 , updates his belief about θ 1 , and then chooses an action a 1 , which is observed by the sender. In the second period, the sender observes the state θ 2 and sends a signal s 2 drawn from the distribution prescribed by the information policy at the history h 2 = (θ 1 , s 1 , a 1 , θ 2 ). The receiver observes s 2 , updates his belief about θ 2 , and chooses an action a 2 . Payoffs for both periods are then realized. 10 I solve for the sender's optimal information policy by working backwards. After receiving signal s 2 in the second period, the receiver maximizes his flow payoff by matching his action with his updated expectation of θ 2 . Let v 2 denote the conditional variance of θ 2 as assessed by the receiver after observing signal s 2 . By standard properties of the quadratic loss function, the second-period expected flow payoffs are −v 2 for the receiver and −β 2 − v 2 for the sender.
In the first period, the receiver's action affects not only his flow payoff but also the informativeness of the second-period signal. Upon receiving signal s 1 in the first period, the receiver may shift his action away from his updated expectation E[θ 1 |s 1 ] if doing so will be rewarded with a more precise signal in the second period. Let v 1 denote Var(θ 1 |s 1 ), the conditional variance of θ 1 given s 1 . Without any further information from the sender, the receiver can choose his myopic best responses a ′ 1 = E[θ 1 |s 1 ] and a ′ 2 = ρ E[θ 1 |s 1 ] to obtain the expected payoff
Therefore, a necessary condition for the receiver to choose action a 1 = E[θ 1 |s 1 ] + b 1 after signal s 1 is that the resulting flow loss is no greater than the total loss he can secure through
10 In particular, the receiver does not observe his first-period payoff before choosing his second-period action. Otherwise, the receiver could narrow down the first-period state realization to at most two values, namely a1 ± √ u1, where u1 is his first-period flow payoff. 
The first constraint is simply (2). The second constraint states that the receiver's updated variance, upon observing the sender's signal, cannot increase in expectation (by the law of total variance). This optimization problem clarifies the trade-off faced by the sender. The action bias that the sender can extract in the first period is bounded by the receiver's utility gain from perfectly learning the state in the second period. With the quadratic loss function, this utility gain is simply the variance of θ 2 , conditional on s 1 .
The optimal biasb 1 and variancev 1 are as follows. 11 If β ≤ σ, that is, the bias is small relative to the variance of ε, then the sender can fully reveal the state and still extract the full bias β in the first period:b 1 = β andv 1 = 0. At the other extreme, if
, then the sender provides no information in the first period in order to extract as much bias as possible:b 1 = (ρ 2 σ 2 1 + σ 2 ) 1/2 andv 1 = σ 2 1 . For values of β strictly between these two bounds, the sender balances precision and bias with a partially informative signal in the first period:
Here the crucial parameter is ρ 2 , the rate at which uncertainty in the first period propagates into the second period (if no further information is provided). Thus, in the first period, ρ −2 is the rate at which the variance must be increased in order to increase the bias. The optimal biasb 1 is a fraction of β, where the fraction is increasing in ρ 2 (decreasing in ρ −2 ).
The inequality from (2) holds with equality, sov 1 is pinned down byb 1 .
11 I have argued above that in the second period the sender fully reveals the state and the receiver plays his myopic best response. Henceb2 = 0 andv2 = 0.
The solutions above are expressed in terms of the receiver's induced variance. But it remains to specify a signal structure such that each realization induces the desired variance.
This can be achieved through direct action recommendations. Let ξ be a standard normal random variable independent of the state process. Set
It follows from the projection properties of the multivariate Gaussian that Var(θ 1 |S 1 ) = v 1 .
Let S 2 equal θ 2 if A 1 = S 1 , and 0 otherwise, so that the receiver gets no information in the second period if he deviates in the first.
The example presented in this section illustrates the central trade-offs inherent to the design of informational incentives. But this example is limited to a relationship known to involve only two periods of interaction. Indeed, the analysis relied on the receiver's myopic behavior in the second period. To examine the dynamics of information transmission within a long-term relationship without a fixed end-date, the main model extends this example to an infinite horizon. While the main model cannot be solved by working backwards, the full solution will feature deterministic bias and variance, as I show next.
Reducing the dimension of the problem
Optimizing directly over all information policies is complex, so I simplify the optimization in two steps. First, I appeal to the revelation principle to directly characterize whether a decision rule can be induced as a best response to some information policy. The space of all such decision rules, which are called obedient, is still very large. To reduce the dimension of the problem, I next show that the payoff frontier from all obedient decision rules is traced out by those decision rules with non-random bias and variance. It therefore suffices to maximize the sender's utility over this special subclass. This problem can be formulated as a deterministic optimal control problem, which I solve in closed form.
Obedient decision rules
The sender chooses an information policy, but the payoffs for both players depend only on the decision rule A = {A t } determined by the receiver's best response to that policy.
Therefore, it suffices to optimize over the decision rules that can be induced as best responses to at least one information policy. I will give a simple condition characterizing such decision rules.
For any decision rule
Even if the sender provides no further information, the receiver can always choose
for all s ≥ t to secure a loss of
The negative of this expression is the receiver's reservation utility.
This inequality will be called the time-t obedience constraint. 12 It requires that after each time-t history, the receiver's expected continuation loss from following the decision rule is no larger than the expected loss he can secure by choosing his actions myopically without incorporating any further information from the sender.
Lemma 1 (Obedience)

A decision rule A is a best response to at least one information policy if and only if A is obedient.
One direction is clear. If A is a best response to some information policy, then A must be obedient; otherwise, at some time t there is a positive mass of action histories at which the receiver can profitably deviate.
The other direction uses the revelation principle. Consider an arbitrary obedient decision rule A. It must be shown that there is some information policy to which A is a best response for the receiver. Such an information policy must send signals that are fine enough so that A is compatible with S, yet coarse enough so that the receiver has no profitable deviation.
Which information policy provides the receiver with the minimal information needed to choose his actions according to A? The answer is the direct recommendation policy, which sends signals S t = A t , provided that the receiver has followed all past recommendations.
If the receiver ever deviates, then the information policy imposes the maximal punishment by sending a completely uninformative signal in all future periods. The time-t obedience constraint rules out profitable deviations from this policy at each time t.
The sender's problem has been reduced to maximizing her utility u S over all obedient decision rules. This is still a maximization over stochastic processes subject to a continuum 12 Here and below, all inequalities involving conditional expectations are interpreted almost surely.
of inequalities between random variables. Fortunately, it suffices to maximizes over a lowerdimensional subset of decision rules identified next.
Bias and variance
I argue that the decision rules with deterministic bias and variance, as formally defined below, trace out the frontier of payoffs from all obedient decision rules. For any decision rule A, define the associated bias and variance processes by
The bias B t is the gap between the recommended action and the receiver's expectation of the state, given the recommendations he has received so far; V t is the conditional variance of the state θ t , given the history of recommendations up to time t. Thus B t and V t are random because they depend on the history of recommendations up to time t, which in turn depends on the state history observed by the sender.
The players' payoffs and the obedience condition can be entirely expressed in terms of these bias and variance processes. The receiver's reservation loss on the right side of the
The sender's expected flow loss is
The receiver's time-t expectation of his time-s flow loss, for s ≥ t, is
where
Crucially, what appears in these decompositions is the difference between the expected state E[θ t |F AFor any nonnegative x and h, let
provided κ ̸ = 0, and let η(x, h) = x + σ 2 h otherwise. If the variance of the state is x at time t, then the variance evolves to η(x, h) at time t + h, as long as no information is provided
The first inequality is the initial variance constraint: The variance cannot increase after the sender's initial disclosure, by the law of total variance. 14 The second inequality is the no-disclosure upper bound. It states that the receiver's variance never increases faster than it would if the sender provided no information. Bayes-plausibility also proves to be sufficient in the sense that a stochastic process can be constructed with deterministic variance v if and only if v is Bayes-plausible. This will be proven in Section 6. The following lemma justifies the focus on decision rules with deterministic bias and variance.
Lemma 2 (Deterministic bias and variance)
For each obedient decision rule A, there exists an obedient decision rule A ′ with deterministic bias and variance such that
The idea of the proof is to select a decision rule A ′ with deterministic bias and variance
. It can then be checked that A ′ gives both players higher payoffs than A.
By Lemma 2, it suffices to maximize over obedient decision rules with deterministic bias and variance. Though the bias and variance functions do not uniquely pin down the decision rule, they do pin down the payoffs for both players, so the optimization can be performed directly over these functions.
Optimal information policy
The previous section reduces the domain of optimization from information policies to deterministic bias and variance functions. Formally, the reduced problem is to select real-valued bias and variance functions b and v to solve 14 Of course, it is possible for some realizations of a signal to increase the variance, but the variance cannot increase in expectation, and here the variance is non-random.
The first constraint is the obedience condition. For decision rules with deterministic bias and variance, obedience reduces to a continuum of non-random inequalities. Namely, at each time t, the receiver's expected continuation loss from obeying the sender's recommendations is no greater than his expected continuation loss from deviating at time t, forfeiting all future information, and acting optimally given the information acquired up to time t. Finally, Bayes-plausibility is imposed in the last two constraints.
Two benchmarks
To provide some context for the full solution, I consider two benchmarks. First, suppose that the sender cannot observe the receiver's actions. Then the receiver will play a myopic best response to his belief at each point in time. Since utilities are quadratic, the receiver simply matches his action with his expectation of the state. It is then optimal for the sender to provide full information, resulting in a total loss of 0 for the receiver and β 2 for the sender. This is not surprising in view of the precision-leverage trade-off. When the leverage effect is shut down, the sender simply maximizes precision. Importantly, this case shows that the sender has no "persuasion" motive for withholding information from the sender.
For the second benchmark, consider the monitoring structure of the main model, but suppose that the sender is restricted to a stationary policy of the form (b(t), v(t)) = (b, v) for all times t. The no-disclosure bound reduces to the requirement that if the state process is stationary (κ < 0), then the induced variance cannot exceed the variance of the stationary distribution. The stationary optimization problem is
The optimal stationary policy depends on the instantaneous drift κ. Increasing the receiver's uncertainty decreases both his continuation value and his reservation utility, but the relative effects depend on κ. If κ < 0, then the continuation value decreases by more, so the sender's leverage actually decreases. If κ = 0, then the two effects are identical, so the sender's leverage is unchanged. If κ > 0, then the reservation utility decreases by more, so the sender's leverage increases. But increasing the receiver's uncertainty also entails a flow cost for the sender. The benefits of increasing leverage outweigh the cost of decreased precision if and only if 2κβ > rσ/ √ r − 2κ. In this case, the optimal choice of v is positive.
These benchmarks suggest the qualitative form of the full solution. Increasing the receiver's uncertainty reduces the receiver's reservation utility, but the resulting leverage for the sender is mitigated by the reduction in the receiver's continuation value. Without the stationarity restriction, it is possible to decouple these two effects. The receiver's reservation utility depends only on the current level of variance, but his continuation value from obedience depends on an integral over future times. The sender can keep the receiver's uncertainty high early in the relationship to depress his reservation utility, while simultaneously promising to provide more precise information in the future, to dampen the effect on the receiver's continuation value. Therefore, the sender will decrease the receiver's uncertainty over time, in order to provide incentives efficiently.
Full solution
To solve for the optimal policy, the key observation is that the obedience constraint must be active at each time t. Otherwise, the sender could increase both players' payoffs by reducing the variance over a small interval, without violating obedience. 15
If the obedience constraint is active at each time t, then the variance function must satisfy the differential equation
This law of motion for the variance has a clear analogy with the law of motion for capital in a standard consumption-savings problem. The first term describes the autonomous evolution of the receiver's variance when no information is provided. In order to induce the receiver to choose an action with bias b(t), the sender must reduce the receiver's variance at a rate proportional to b 2 (t), the receiver's flow loss from incorporating the bias into this action.
The greater the bias, the more quickly the sender must reduce the receiver's variance, thus forfeiting her own informational advantage. The coefficient r − 2κ can be interpreted as the incentive cost of extracting bias. More information is required as compensation when the receiver is impatient (large r) or if information perishes quickly (small κ). 16 Assuming the obedience constraint binds, the only remaining challenge comes from the initial variance constraint. I first drop this constraint and solve the relaxed problem by attaching suitable Lagrange multipliers to the continuum of constraints. Then I form the Lagrangian by integrating. If the solution to this relaxed problem satisfies the initial variance constraint, then this relaxed solution must be a solution to the original problem.
If the relaxed solution violates the initial variance constraint, then I apply a dynamic programming argument to show that the solution to the constrained problem coincides with a time-shifted version of the relaxed solution.
In the theorem statements below, the persistence parameter κ often appears in the denominator. All the results still hold for κ = 0 if each expressions is replaced with its limit as κ tends to 0. Below, this qualification will be omitted to simplify the presentation.
Theorem 1 (Optimal information policy)
The optimal bias-variance pair (b,v) is unique and given as follows.
where the full-disclosure time T takes the unique value for which the inequalitiesb(0) ≤ β andv(0) ≤ σ 2 0 both hold, at least one with equality. 17
The form of the optimal policy depends on size of the sender's bias β relative to
, then the sender can induce the receiver to choose the sender's first-best decision rule A t = θ t + β. The sender reveals the state perfectly to the receiver but threatens to cut off all future information if the receiver does not take the sender's preferred action. The threshold σ/ √ r − 2κ is the square root of the receiver's reservation loss when he knows the current state. Naturally, this loss is increasing in the variance rate σ and the persistence parameter κ. But this loss is decreasing in the receiver's discount rate r since a higher discount rate means that the receiver puts more weight on the near future, when his information is still fresh.
If β > σ/ √ r − 2κ, then the sender's first-best decision rule is not obedient. This case can be further split according to which of the two inequalities
Here r is the common discount rate for the sender and the receiver. The solution to the extension with different discounts rates (Section 7.2) shows that it is indeed the receiver's discount rate that determines the law of motion for the variance.
17 Here x+ denotes the positive part max{x, 0} of a real number x. down the full-disclosure time T . If the initial variance σ 2 0 is sufficiently large, then the first inequality binds. In this case, the sender makes an initial disclosure at time 0 that causes the variance to jump down discontinuously. At time 0, after making this initial disclosure, the sender recommends that the receiver shift his action above his expectation of the state by β. As time passes, the sender provides increasingly precise information about the state and reduces the level of bias she demands. The state will be fully revealed at time T , given
) .
From this time forward, the sender keeps the receiver perfectly informed of the state.
If instead the initial variance σ 2 0 is small enough that the inequalityv(0) ≤ σ 2 0 pins down T , then the sender initially provides no information and recommends a bias less than β. The dynamics are then exactly as above. Indeed the bias and variance in this case are simply time-translations of the corresponding functions in the high-σ 2 0 case. The optimal policy is plotted in Figure 1 , assuming the initial variance σ 2 0 is large enough not to bind. Upon taking derivatives, it is straightforward to check that before time T the variance and bias functions are strictly decreasing and strictly convex. If the variance σ 2 0 does bind, then the solution can be obtained by starting time at t 0 , defined byv(t 0 ) = σ 2 0 . Figure 2 decomposes the players' flow losses according to two sources, the systematic bias of the receiver's action and the dispersion of the receiver's action relative to the state.
At the beginning of the relationship, the sender's loss is entirely due to the dispersion of the receiver's action, while the receiver's flow loss comes from both sources. Over time, as the sender provides the receiver with more information and demands less bias, the composition shifts. From the full-disclosure time onwards, the receiver knows the state perfectly, so both players' flow losses are due to systematic bias only.
The optimal solution is continuous in the variance rate σ 2 . If the state is deterministic, the solution follows from taking the limit as σ tends to 0.
Corollary 1 (Optimum with deterministic state)
If σ = 0, the optimal bias-variance process is unique and given bŷ
When the state evolves deterministically, the sender never fully reveals the state. Instead, the receiver's uncertainty tends to 0 asymptotically. The state is fixed if κ = σ = 0. In this case, the formulas simplify tô 
Comparative statics
Proposition 1 (Comparative statics)
Suppose that β > σ/ √ r − 2κ and the initial variance constraint is not binding. 18
1. The optimal bias functionb is increasing in β and σ 2 and decreasing in r − 2κ.
The optimal variance functionv is increasing in β and decreasing in σ 2 .
First consider the comparative statics in the sender's preference bias β. As β increases, so does the sender's marginal benefit from inducing the receiver to increase his action.
Thus, the sender provides the receiver with less information, sacrificing precision in order to increase her leverage to recommend higher actions.
Next consider the comparative statics with respect to the variance rate σ 2 , the common discount rate r, and the percentage drift κ. These parameters all appear in the receiver's reservation utility. For a given conditional variance, as σ 2 or κ increases or r decreases, the receiver's reservation utility decreases. Hence the sender has greater leverage to increase her action recommendations. Equivalently, the sender can induce a given reservation utility with a lower conditional variance. This level effect tends to increase the optimal bias and decrease the optimal variance. But as κ increases or r decreases, the reservation utility also becomes more sensitive to the variance. This marginal effect tends to increase the optimal variance. As a result, the effects of κ and r on the optimal variance are ambiguous.
18 The initial variance constraint is not binding if and only if Figure 3 . Delayed report at time τ and the receiver's resulting expectations.
Implementation by delayed reporting
I have computed the optimal bias and variance functions, but it remains to define an information policy that induces a best response of the desired form. In this section I propose delayed reporting as a convenient method of implementation. The idea is that at each time t, the sender reports the exact realization of the state at a previous time. Initially, there is no previous state to report, so I assume that the receiver has access to an independent standard Brownian motion Y = {Y t } t≥0 as a randomization device. Extend {θ t } t∈R + to {θ t } t∈R by defining θ t = Y −t + θ 0 for t < 0.
Delayed reporting is parameterized by a single reporting function, which is defined as a weakly increasing function φ : [0, ∞) → [−∞, ∞) such that φ(t) ≤ t for each t. I include
−∞ in the codomain to allow for the possibility that the sender provides no information.
At each time t, the sender reports the realization of θ φ(t)
. Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the receiver's information at time τ under delayed reporting. The receiver knows θ φ(τ ) and uses this to form expectations about the state at all subsequent times. Since the receiver's updated belief is determined by the most recent report, there is no loss in requiring that reporting functions be weakly increasing.
The purpose of the reporting function is to induce a desired deterministic variance function v. Formally, a reporting function φ induces a variance function v if
Var(θ t |θ φ(t) ) = v(t),
for all times t ≥ 0, with the convention that Var(θ t |θ −∞ ) = Var(θ t ). If φ induces v, then for any bias function b, the following decision rule has deterministic bias b and variance v:
As stated in the next theorem, each Bayes-plausible variance function can induced by some reporting function. 19
Theorem 2 (Delayed reporting)
Let v be a function from [0, ∞) to [0, ∞). The following are equivalent. approaches T as well. Thereafter, the sender reports without a delay:
The function v is Bayes-plausible.
There exists a decision rule A such that E[Var(θ t |F A t )] = v(t) for all t. 3. There exists a reporting function φ that induces the variance function v.
There is a kink when the reporting function crosses 0 only because the fictitious history has a different distribution than the true state process.
Aside from its mathematical simplicity, delayed reporting has a few other advantages.
First, delayed reporting simplifies the receiver's belief-updating process substantially. Instead of having to extract and aggregate the state information contained in the entire signal history, the sender can form his belief at each time t from the time-t signal realization alone.
Moreover, once φ becomes positive, the sender's signals depend deterministically on the realized state history. Therefore, delayed reporting is a particularly appealing implementation if there are concerns about the sender's ability to commit to lotteries with specified probabilities.
As an illustration of the broader applicability of delayed reporting, consider Ely's (2017) leading example of designing email notifications to minimize distractions. In that model, emails arrive over time, and the state is binary, indicating whether an unread email is waiting. The optimal policy features a beep that sounds after an email arrives, but with a delay of length ∆. This policy is in fact delayed reporting with the reporting function φ(t) = (t−∆) + . In the email example the initial state is known, so setting φ(t) = 0 provides no information. Thus, there is no need for a fictitious history and all the sender's signals depend deterministically on past states. Figure 4 . Optimal reporting function.
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Extensions
This section considers two extensions of the main model and solves for the optimal information policy in each one. In the first extension, states and actions are multidimensional and the components of the state evolve independently. In the second extension, the sender and receiver discount the future at different rates.
Multidimensional state
Suppose that the state is n-dimensional so that θ t = (θ t,1 , . . . , θ t,n ) ∈ R n . The components of the initial state θ 0 are independent, and each component θ 0,i has a normal distribution N (µ i , σ 2 0,i ). Thereafter, the components of the state evolve independently, each according to a linear stochastic differential equation
Each σ i is positive and the Z i = {Z t,i } t≥0 are independent standard Brownian motions.
Assume r > 2κ i for each i. The parameters will be collected into the parameter vectors σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) and σ 0 = (σ 0,1 , . . . , σ 0,n ). Order the components by the drift, so that
At each time t, the receiver chooses an action a t ∈ R n . The flow utilities for the receiver and sender, respectively, are given by
where the sender's bias is β = (β 1 , . . . , β n ) ∈ R n .
The interpretation is that the sender observes multiple independent components of the state. For instance, in the example of a manager and an employee, one component could represent the employee's progress and the other could represent conditions at the firm or in the industry, which evolve independently of the employee's progress. With minor modifications of the arguments in the main model, it can be shown that the optimal policy takes the form of deterministic bias and variance functions, which are now vector-valued.
Moreover, it is straightforward to check that the optimal bias vector must always point in the direction of the sender's bias β. Therefore, it suffices to specify a real-valued biasmagnitude function b and a vector-valued variance function v, where v i (t) = Var(θ t,i |F A t ). Likewise, define η i as in (4) with κ i and σ i in place of κ and σ, respectively. The sender's problem is now minimize
Clearly, the sender could make the single-dimensional optimal choices for each separate component. But she can do strictly better. Since the obedience constraints are summed across components, the sender can violate the obedience constraint in one dimension and make up the difference in another dimension.
In the multidimensional setting, the maximal bias that can be maintained when the receiver knows the current state isσ
In particular,σ 2 =σ 2 n . The second expression depends on the times t i to be defined below. is unique and given as follows.
Theorem 3 (Optimum with multidimensional state)
If the state is n-dimensional, then the optimal bias-variance process
I. If ∥β∥ ≤σ, thenb(t) = β andv(t) = 0.
II. If ∥β∥ >σ,b
For i < i 0 , the variancev i (t) equals 0. For i ≥ i 0 , the variance isv i is defined
,
Here the critical component i 0 and the full-disclosure times t n ≥ · · · ≥ t i 0 ≥ t i 0 −1 := 0 take the unique values for which
Recall that the components of the state are ordered by increasing drift, i.e., from most to least mean-reverting. The optimal policy provides information about the components sequentially, starting with the most mean-reverting, in order to hold down the receiver's reservation utility. The sender immediately discloses the most mean-reverting components i = 1, . . . , i 0 − 1 and continues to keep the receiver perfectly informed of these components. With this notation, the bias can be expressed aŝ
Thus the bias takes the same form as in the main model, except it decreases at the timedependent exponential rate r − 2κî (t) rather than r − 2κ.
The optimal policy for an example with three components is plotted in Figure 5 . In this example, the critical component i 0 is 2. At time 0, the sender completely discloses component 1 and makes a partial disclosure about component 2. The sender then gradually provides information about component 2 until the full-disclosure time t 2 . From time t 2 to t 3 , component 3 is gradually revealed, and beyond time t 3 , the receiver is kept perfectly informed of all components.
Different discount rates
In the main model, the sender and receiver share a common discount rate r. In this extension, suppose instead that the sender and receiver have respective discount rates r S and r R , where r S > 2κ and r R > 2κ. As in the main model, the problem can be reduced to choosing a bias function b and a variance function v to solve minimize
The sender's discount rate r S only affects the objective function, while the receiver's discount rate r R only affects the feasible set, through the obedience constraint. The no-disclosure bounds and the initial variance constraint are just as in the main model since they do not depend on preferences. When the obedience constraint is active, the variance function must satisfy the differential equation
The law of motion for the variance depends on the receiver's discount rate, but the sender will choose the bias path that is optimal given her own discount rate r S
Theorem 4 (Optimum with different discount rates)
If the sender and receiver have respective discount rates r S and r R , then the optimal biasvariance pair (b,v) is unique and given as follows.
The variancev vanishes after time T and is characterized before time T by the initial value problemv
Here the full-disclosure time T takes the unique value for which the inequalitiesb(0) ≤ β andv(0) ≤ σ 2 0 both hold, at least one with equality. Figure 6 . The case of a relatively patient sender (r S < r R ) is plausible when the sender is an institution and the receiver is an individual. In this case, the qualitative behavior of the optimal policy is very similar to the main model. The bias and variance decay monotonically until some finite time beyond which the variance is zero and the bias is constant. Moreover, the obedience constraint is active at every time t.
An example of this solution for different values of r S is shown in
When the receiver is relatively patient (r R < r S ), however, the solution is slightly different. As before, the bias and variance decay until some finite time when the variance reaches zero. Beyond this time, the sender still keeps the receiver perfectly informed, but now the bias continues to decay asymptotically towards zero. The intuition is that starting with the solution from the main model, the bias can be increased early in the relationship and decreased later in the relationship in a way that makes both the impatient sender and the patient receiver better off. One consequence is that the obedience constraint is inactive beyond the full-disclosure time. That is, the sender initially promises that after the fulldisclosure time she will keep the receiver's continuation value strictly above his reservation utility. Hence, this policy leans most heavily on the commitment assumption.
With the discount rates of the two players decoupled, I can establish new comparative statics in r S .
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics in patience)
Suppose that β > σ/ √ r R − 2κ and the initial variance constraint is not binding. Then the optimal bias and variance functionsb andv are both decreasing in r S .
If the initial variance is not binding, then a more impatient sender initially discloses less information to the receiver and recommends a smaller bias. Recall that keeping the receiver less informed reduces the sender's flow payoff but serves as an investment in future flexibility (by relaxing the obedience constraints). When the sender is more impatient, she finds this investment less attractive. Therefore, she discloses more information and then reduces the recommended bias to satisfy the tightened obedience constraint. In the consumption-savings analogy, an impatient sender "spends down" her capital (the receiver's variance) more quickly.
Conclusion
This paper studies the provision of information as an intertemporal incentive. The sender faces a trade-off between precision and leverage. She resolves this trade-off with a nonstationary policy that gradually reveals more and more information over time. The "life cycle" of a gradually deepening informational relationship therefore arises endogenously, not because the sender comes to "trust" the receiver, but rather as the solution to an incentive problem. The primary methodological contribution is delayed reporting, which holds promise more broadly in Markovian settings as a convenient technique for implementing dynamic information policies.
My model rules out transfers in order to highlight the potential for information to serve as an incentive device. The model is directly applicable to settings where transfers are either prohibited or inflexible. But I expect that many features of the optimal information policy would carry over to settings with transfers. A richer model incorporating transfers could address the optimal composition of an incentive system that features both money and information. This is a promising direction for future work.
A Formal definition of strategies
Because continuous time is not well-ordered, perfect monitoring presents technical difficulties (Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989) . This section formally defines strategies for both players. Unless otherwise specified, the definitions used below can be found in the first chapter of Karatzas and Shreve (1998) . Fix a probability space (Ω, F, P) that is sufficiently rich to carry all the random objects introduced below. The driving process Z = {Z t } is a standard Brownian motion and the initial state θ 0 has a normal distribution N (µ 0 , σ 2 0 ), independent of Z. Let
where the integral is an Itô integral. Let {F θ t } denote the filtration generated by {θ t }, 20 and set
. Next, I endow the sender with an independent, sufficiently rich σ-algebra to be used for randomization. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra of F that is independent of F θ ∞ , and let Y be a standard Brownian motion that is measurable with respect to G. To simplify the notation below, setF θ t = σ(G ∪ F θ t ). The filtration {F θ t } represents the exogenous information available to the sender.
Let D[0, ∞) denote the space of all cadlag functions from [0, ∞) to R. 21 Equip D[0, ∞) with the cylindrical filtration {C t− }, where C t− denotes the σ-algebra generated by the projection maps for times strictly before t.
An information policy consists of a measurable space (S, S) and a map
The interpretation is that the sender's signal at time t can depend on (i) the sender's exogenous information, throughF θ t ; and (ii) actions taken by the receiver strictly before time t, through C t− . An information policy will be denoted simply by S.
A decision rule is a real-valued {F θ t }-adapted stochastic process on (Ω, F) with cadlag sample paths. Given an information policy S and a decision rule A, define the composed stochastic process S • A by
(S • A)(t, ω) = S(t, ω, A(ω)
) . arising from the self-referential measurability requirement in (i). In particular, it prevents the receiver from conveying, through his action choices, additional information that is not contained in any of the sender's signals.
ω, a). A decision rule
Finally, a decision rule A is a best response to an information policy S if (i) A is compatible with S, and (ii) u R (A) ≥ u R (A ′ ) for all decision rules A ′ compatible with S. 22
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. If X is measurable with respect to F, then
Proof of Lemma B.1. We have
where the second equality follows from expanding and noting that the cross terms cancel by the measurability of X with respect to F. The final expression is simply Var(Z|F), and taking expectations gives the result. Now I turn to the main proof. First, I prove that obedience is necessary. Let A be a best response to an information policy S. Suppose for a contradiction that A is not obedient. Then there exists a non-random time τ and a set G ∈ F A τ with positive probability such that the time-τ obedience constraint is violated at almost every ω ∈ G. Let f : Ω → R be a version of the conditional expectation
By construction, A ′ is compatible with S. Since A ′ only differs from A on the set G,
By conditioning on F A t and using the failure of obedience on G, it can be shown that u R (A ′ ) > u R (A), contrary to the optimality of A. 22 In settings with continuous-time perfect monitoring, there are different ways of defining strategies so that outcomes are well-defined. See for the example the grid method of Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) or the inertia strategies of Bergin and MacLeod (1993) . Here I use a very permissive notion of compatibility, which makes the best response requirement more demanding. Hence, Lemma 1 is stronger. Now I turn to sufficiency. Given an obedient decision rule A, I construct an information policy S to which A is a best response. First, define the detection-time function
where the infimum of the empty set is taken to be ∞. Choose the signal realization space (S, S) to be the real line R with the Borel σ-algebra B(R), and define S :
Using the fact that integration up to time t, viewed as a functional on D[0, ∞), is measurable with respect to C t− , 23 it follows from standard arguments that S is adapted to {F θ t ⊗ C t− }.
Moreover, A is compatible with S because H(ω, A(ω)) = ∞ and hence S(t, ω, A(ω))
t } be an arbitrary decision rule that is compatible with
Clearly A is adapted to {F A t }, and A ′ is adapted to {F A t } by the second condition in the definition of compatibility. Since A and A ′ have cadlag sample paths, Proposition 1.13 of Karatzas and Shreve (1998) implies that A and A ′ are progressively measurable with respect to {F A t }.
Define the random time T by T (ω) = H(ω, A ′ (ω)). Then S • A is the stopped process
ds is progressively measurable with respect to {F A t }. Clearly X has continuous sample paths. By Problem 2.6 of Karatzas and Shreve (1998) , T is an optional time with respect to {F A t }. Therefore, for each t, A ′ t is measurable with respect to the stopped σ-algebra
For each n, define the simple random time T n by
For each ω ∈ Ω, we have T n (ω) > T (ω) and T n (ω) ↓ T (ω). Define the decision rule A n by
Since u R (A ′ ) are u R (A) are both finite (by assumption and by obedience respectively), Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem gives
for every ω ∈ Ω. By Fubini's theorem and another application of Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem, I conclude that u R (A n ) → u R (A ′ ). Therefore, it suffices to check that
Fix n and let t 1 , . . . , t K denote the finite values that T n takes with positive probability. For each k, let I k be the indicator for the event that T n = t k . Thus I 1 + · · · + I K is an indicator for the event that T n is finite. Split the integral according to the values of T n to obtain
To complete the proof, I check that each term in the sum is nonnegative. 
] . 
Now consider the expression involving
Combining these inequalities completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let A be an obedient decision rule. Define bias and variance functions b and v by
By Theorem 2, there exists a reporting function φ that induces v. Consider the decision rule A ′ defined by
. Both sides of the time-t obedience constraint for A ′ are non-random, so the constraint reduces to the inequality
which follows from the time-t obedience constraint for A by taking expectations.
It remains to check that A ′ Pareto dominates A. We have
where the first inequality follows from the law of total variance and the penultimate equality follows from the definition of A ′ . A similar calculation gives
B.3 Proof of Theorem 1
First I verify that the full-disclosure time T in the theorem statement is well-defined. The expressions forb andv in the theorem statement are strictly increasing in (T −t) + . Therefore, there are unique times T b and T v such that putting (T, t) = (T b , 0) in the expression forb(t) gives β and putting (T, t) = (T v , 0) in the expression forv gives σ 2 0 . 24 Now I turn to the proof proper. Drop the no-disclosure bounds on the variance to obtain the relaxed problem minimize
It is straightforward to check thatv satisfies the no-disclosure bounds. I will prove that (b,v) is the unique solution of (B.1). The proof is separated into two parts. The first part proves optimality. In the second part, the claimed uniqueness is stated precisely and then proved.
, then optimality is immediate, so for the remainder of the optimality proof assume β > σ/ √ r − 2κ. Consider the following auxiliary problem without 24 The time T b is
) , but Tv cannot be expressed in closed form.
the initial variance constraint: Proof of Lemma. I directly verify the optimality of (b,ṽ) by attaching suitable nonnegative Lagrange multipliers e −rt λ(t) to each time-t obedience constraint and re −rt µ(t) to each time-t nonnegativity constraint. 25 Integrate over these constraints to form the Lagrangian
After splitting the term in braces by the linearity of the integral, 26 the double integral in the obedience constraint can be rearranged as
where I have switched the order of integration by Tonelli's theorem. Next, swap the dummy variable names s and t in this integral, and define the accumulated multiplier
The Lagrangian L (b, v, µ, λ) can now be expressed as
where the integrand ℓ (
Define the nonnegative multipliers by
Plugging these expressions into the Lagrangian, the coefficient on v(t) vanishes, and the integrand in (B.3) becomes
This expression is convex in b(t) and the first-order condition gives
Here, the middle equality uses the identity
which is immediate from the definition of T b . It follows that (b(t),ṽ(t)) minimizes the integrand in (B.3) for each time t, hence (b,ṽ) minimizes the Lagrangian. Optimality then follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are straightforward to verify. In particular, it can be checked that (b,ṽ) satisfies every obedience constraint with equality. 
B.4 Proof of Corollary 1
The proof of uniqueness is exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix B.3. For optimality, note that the sender's feasible set is increasing in σ with respect to set inclusion. This means that the sender's optimal value u S (b σ ,v σ ) for any σ > 0 is an upper bound, and hence it suffices to check that
Fix all parameters except the variance rate σ 2 σ. For any σ > 0, express the functions b andṽ from Appendix B.3 as
Taking b 0 = β in the statement of the corollary gives
For each time t, as σ ↓ 0, we haveb(t; σ) ↓b(t; 0) andṽ(t; σ) ↓ṽ(t; 0). Hence t 0 (σ) ↓ t 0 (0), so it follows thatb andv obey the same monotone pointwise convergence. For any bias and variance functions (b, v) , let u S (b, v) denote the sender's utility from (b, v) . By Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem (withb(t; 0) andv(t; 1) as dominating functions), it follows that u S (b(σ),v(σ)) ↓ u S (b(0),v(0)), as desired.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that β > σ/ √ r − 2κ and the initial variance constraint is not binding. Then the full-disclosure time T is given by
I prove the statements of the theorem in turn.
and note that this expression is increasing in σ and decreasing in r − 2κ. 2. First define an auxiliary functionṽ :
Note thatṽ(τ ) is increasing in σ 2 . Moreover, for each τ > 0,
soṽ is a strictly increasing function. From (B.4), observe that T is decreasing in σ 2 . Therefore,v(t) =ṽ((T − t) + ) is strictly decreasing in σ 2 .
B.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Clearly, (3) implies (2). I will show that (2) implies (1), and (1) 
For s > t ≥ 0, the law of total variance gives
By the SDE governing the state process and the fact that θ s − θ t is independent of F A t , the right side can be expressed as
so the no-disclosure bound follows.
(
This property will be referred to as monotonicity in the proof below.
Define the reporting function φ implicitly by the following piecewise system:
By construction, φ induces the desired variance function, so it suffices to check that φ is well-defined and satisfies the requirements a reporting function.
First I check that φ is well-defined. The cases are clearly exclusive, and they are exhaustive because v(t) ≤ η(σ 2 0 , t), which follows from the initial variance constraint and monotonicity. The solution of the second equation is unique because η is strictly increasing in its first argument; the solution of the third equation is unique because η(0, ·) is strictly increasing and η(0, 0) = 0.
It is immediate that φ(t) ≤ t for all t. To complete the proof, I check that φ is (weakly) increasing. For any fixed t, the solution sets to the second and third cases are (−∞, 0) and [0, t), respectively. Fix s > t. Apply the monotonicity property with c = σ 2 0 and c = 0 to see that s must fall into a weakly higher case than t. If s is in a strictly higher case than t, clearly φ(s) > φ(t). If s and t are in the same case, then monotonicity implies that φ(s) ≥ φ(t).
B.7 Proof of Theorem 3
First I check that the critical component i 0 and the full-disclosure times t i 0 ≤ t i 0 +1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n are well-defined. Guess a pair (i 0 , t n ). For each i > i 0 , the required equalityv i (0) = σ 2 0,i pins down t i−1 as a function of t i , hence t n−1 , . . . , t i 0 can be expressed as functions of (i 0 , t n ). The required inequalityv i 0 (0) ≤ σ 2 0,i 0 then pins down the critical component i 0 . Finally, t n is pinned down by (2). Now I turn to the proof proper. If ∥β∥ ≤σ, the sender's first-best policy is obedient and hence uniquely optimal. So assume ∥β∥ >σ. Drop all no-disclosure bounds except those starting at time 0 to obtain the relaxed problem minimize
] dt subject to
It is straightforward to check thatv satisfies the dropped no-disclosure bounds. To prove that (b,v) solves (B.5), I consider an auxiliary problem. Redefine t i 0 −1 so that
Formally, auxiliary problem is to choose functions b :
Define the auxiliary functionsb : [t 0 , ∞) → R andṽ : [t 0 , ∞) → R as follows. For i > i 0 and t < 0, setṽ i (t) = σ 2 0,i . Otherwise, simply defineb(t) andṽ i (t) by the corresponding expressions forb(t) andv i (t) in the theorem statement, with our new definition of t i 0 −1 . Lemma B.3. The functionsb andṽ solve the auxiliary problem (B.6). This expression is convex in b(t) and the first-order condition gives b(t) = β exp(−S(t)) =σ exp (S(t n ) − S(t)) =b(t).
Proof of
as needed. Primal feasibility, dual feasibility, and complementary slackness can be easily checked, so optimality follows from the sufficiency of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Optimality follows from dynamic programming as before. For uniqueness, we take a different approach. The proof of the lemma shows that (b,ṽ) minimizes the Lagrangian with the chosen multipliers. Suppose (b, v) is another solution. Plugging this into the Lagrangian, we see that (b, v) solves the Lagrangian associated to the original problem. This means the same constraints must bind, which implies uniqueness.
B.8 Proof of Theorem 4
Just as in the proof of Theorem 1, the full-disclosure time T is well-defined, so I turn to the proof proper. If β ≤ σ/ √ r R − 2κ, the sender's first-best policy is obedience and hence uniquely optimal. So assume β > σ/ √ r − 2κ. Drop the no-disclosure bounds on the variance to obtain the problem minimize where the last equality follows from the definition of T b . By construction, the obedience constraint holds with equality for all times t, and the nonnegativity constraint is active for all times t ≥ T b . Therefore, primal feasibility, dual feasibility, and complementary slackness are all satisfied, so optimality follows from the sufficiency of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
The remainder of the proof proceeds like the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix B.3.
where the final inequality uses the fact thatb 1 (t) ≤b 2 (t), proven above. By Grönwall's inequality, it follows that v ′ 1 (t) −v ′ 2 (t) ≤ (v 1 (T 1 ) −v 2 (T 1 ))e 2κ(t−T 1 ) = −v 2 (T 1 )e 2κ(t−T 1 ) < 0.
